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Abstract
Why have separatist sentiments increased in Hong Kong despite of China’s growing
economic attractiveness? This question is critical forChina–HongKong relations.However,
few studies have explored it from a comparative perspective. This study compares Hong
Kong and mainland college students’ national identities by making a series of interlocked
surveys and interviews from 2012 to 2016. It shows that Hong Kong students have a much
lower sociopolitical identity with China, which proves to be the primary cause for their
separatist tendencies. Although they hold a comparably strong pan-Chinese economic
identity, it does not strengthen their sociopolitical identity as it does for mainland students.
This can be attributed to their post-materialist framework through which they are unlikely
to believe that economic development alone can bring sociopolitical improvements. The
findings imply that China faces serious difficulties in turning its economic strength into
political charm in societies with strong post-materialist values.
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Introduction
Despite China’s increasing economic power and accelerated integration with Hong
Kong, the past several years have witnessed plummeting national identity and rising
separatist sentiments among the Hong Kong public, notably among the post-80s and
post-90s generation (Figure 1). For example, growing numbers of youngsters have
deliberately resisted Hong Kong–mainland integration by launching and participating in
large-scale social movements against public policies that aim to draw the local system
closer to the mainland (Ramzy, 2019; Washington Post, 2012). Some extremists have
even organised anti-China movements, such as “anti-Chinese tourists” and the “Hong
Kong independence movement” (Hung, 2012; Ma, 2015). The 2014 “Occupy Central”
movement and 2019 “Anti-Extradition Bill” protests also highlight growing separatist
tendencies, albeit in the name of democracy and freedom.
Why have separatist tendencies grown in Hong Kong in spite of China’s growing
economic attractiveness? This question is critical for China–Hong Kong relations. It also
contains strong implications regarding China’s relations with other offshore Chinese
societies, such as Taiwan, in which vibrant anti-Chinese sentiments have erupted despite
accelerated economic integration with China (Li, 2014). China’s growing economic
might has generated heated discussions concerning the extent to which it will change
China’s relations with others, for example, whether China’s rising economic and military
power will present a threat to the international order (Bernstein and Munro, 1997; Gertz
2002; Johnston 2003; Kirshner 2012). However, scholars and observers frequently focus
on China’s growth in economic might and its military build-up and assume that such
increased power will result in compliance and attractiveness to others, including the
peripheral Chinese societies (Halper, 2010; Jacques, 2009; Kurlantzick, 2008). Rising
separatist tendencies in Hong Kong suggest that such an assumption may be an over-
simplification. Much still remains unclear regarding whether and to what extent China
can transform its economic might into overall attractiveness.
This study investigates this question by comparing national identity and perceptions
of China’s economic rise in Hong Kong with those in the mainland, where China’s rise is
observed as having stimulated strong patriotism (Pew Global Attitude Project, 2008; The
Economist, 2009). It focuses on the post-80s and post-90s elite college students in the
two societies. In Hong Kong, this cohort mostly holds particularly weak national identity
and actively participates in various separatist movements (Hong Kong Institute of Asia-
Pacific Studies, 2010; Zheng et al., 2014). By contrast, their mainland counterparts are
one of the most actively nationalist groups, with national pride running high (Hoffmann
and Larner, 2013; Wasserstrom, 2005). Moreover, the two cohorts represent future
political, social, and economic elites in both societies; therefore, their national identities
have strong policy implications for China’s relations with Hong Kong.
This study shows that Hong Kong students have a much weaker sociopolitical
identity with China than their mainland counterparts, which proves to be the primary
cause of their separatist tendencies. Although they exhibit a relatively strong pan-
Chinese economic identity (hereafter pan-economic identity, this identity covers vari-
ous aspects related with China’s economic performance such as “economic
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development” and “science and technology”) in comparison with their mainland coun-
terparts, this pan-economic identity does not strengthen their sociopolitical identity as it
does among their mainland counterparts. This can be attributed to Hong Kong students’
post-materialist framework, through which they are much less likely to ascribe China’s
economic growth to the Chinese state or to believe that economic development can bring
a better sociopolitical future for China. The findings imply that China faces serious
difficulties in turning its economic strength into assimilating force for democratic
societies where post-materialist values dominate. Hong Kong’s separatist tendencies will
probably grow stronger in the coming years.
Defining Separatist Tendencies and National Identity
in the Context of China–Hong Kong Relations
“Separatist tendencies” in Hong Kong refers to the propensity of Hong Kong citizens to
distance themselves from mainland China. It is different from general “separatism” or
“schism” which claims to secede from a larger group and to form an independent state
(Leeuwen and Mashuri, 2013; Sani, 2008; Sani and Reicher, 1998; Sani and Todman,
2002), in that it is more about resistance to “integration” with the mainland for the
majority, although excessive separatism does exist in a tiny fraction of the population.
For example, Brian Leung, a student from The University of Hong Kong (HKU), has
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Figure 1. Identity trends of different age groups in Hong Kong, 2008–2017. Source: Public
Opinion Program, University of Hong Kong (POP), “People’s Ethnic Identity,” accessed 30
November 2017.
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called for “Hong Kong People Deciding Their Own Fate,” on the February issue of
Undergrad, the publication of the student union in HKU, in 2014. Despite the excessive
thought, the majority of Hong Kong society does not consider seceding from China as a
viable option, due to its heavy socioeconomic dependence on Mainland. Thus, separatist
tendencies, in general, considered “defensive” in nature (Cheung, 2014).
There have been separatist tendencies in Hong Kong since the 1970s, when a local
identity was formed that was based on local residents’ common life experiences under
British colonial rule (Johnson, 1994; Ma and Fung, 2007). Before Hong Kong’s hand-
over in 1997, most Hongkongers placed their local identity high above their identity with
the mainland, which was believed to be culturally and economically inferior to Hong
Kong (Johnson, 1994; Ma and Fung, 1999; Pun and Yee, 2003). Since 1997, Hong Kong
residents have begun to accept a dual identity as both “Hongkongers” and “Chinese,”
and thus separatist tendencies reduced (Ma and Fung, 2007). Such trend reached its peak
during 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. However, it did not last long. Since 2009, as
mentioned in the “Introduction” section, national identity began to plummet while
separatist tendencies have soared (see Figure 1). This can be seen from growing resis-
tance to economic integration with China, for example, the strong opposition to both
multi-entry permits for Shenzhen citizens and a high-speed rail link to China. There has
been increasing resistance to political influence from the Chinese state, as evidenced by
the deadlock about the 2017 Chief Executive Officer Election reform, which fuelled the
2014 Umbrella Movement.
National identity in this study is defined as an individual’s perception and emotional
attachment to his/her nation-state including such factors as “a named human population
sharing a historic territory, common myths and historical memoires, a public culture, a
common economy and legal rights and duties for all members” (Smith, 1993:13; for
other definitions, see Dahbour, 2002). It is generally divided by an “ethnic” and a “civic”
line in which ethnic identity refers to identification with the nation state’s fixed cultural
markers and bloodlines and civic identity refers to identification with more fluid and
achievable national traits, such as political institutions and norms (Brubaker, 1992). Such
a typology, however, does not fit in with national identity in Hong Kong. Hong Kong
has more than 150-year experience of separation from mainland China, and it has
developed its own local variety of contemporary culture (Lau, 2000). Besides, it does not
share common political institutions and norms with the mainland under the “One
country, Two systems” provision.
Considering these, we divide national identity into three dimensions: cultural, socio-
political, and pan-economic identity. We devise cultural identity as covering not only
ethnicity identity such as national history and traditional culture but also contemporary
Chinese culture for which mainland and Hong Kong students may have distinctive views.
We expand civic identity into a sociopolitical identity which involves identification with
not only political institutions but also social systems including social fairness and justice.
Such expansion is based on the consideration that increasing social interactions between
the two societies should have growing importance in shaping Hong Kong’s citizens’
national identity (Ma, 2015; Shen, 2014). We use pan-economic identity to cover iden-
tification with China’s economic and international performance such as economic
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development, international influence, and military power. Although this dimension is often
ignored in previous studies of national identity, we believe it is of fundamental
importance given Hong Kong’s close economic ties with the mainland have become a
key aspect of its Chinese membership (Shen and Luo, 2013). As China continues its
economic rise, this part of Hong Kong’s identity will become even more salient. As
this shows, the national identity here for the Hong Kong students is, in nature, their
perceptions and evaluations of China’s cultural, sociopolitical, and pan-economic side.
Review of National Identity and Causes for Separatist
Tendencies in Hong Kong
National identity in Hong Kong has received wide-ranging attention given its constant
fluctuations following the return of Hong Kong’s sovereignty to China. The previous
literature shows that the national identity of Hong Kong’s citizens has amorphous and
hybrid features. Their cultural identity is strong, and their view of ancient Chinese
history is largely in line with the mainland Chinese view (Siu, 1996). However, their
attitudes towards the Chinese state, particularly the Chinese Communist Party (CCP),
tend to be negative (Fu et al., 1999; Liu, 1999). Their national identity is sometimes
characterised as “liberal patriotism” (Chan and Chan, 2014). In the socio-economic
realm, prior to 1997, they perceived the mainland as economically backward and
socially chaotic, but this perception has changed with the growth of the mainland
economy (Lee and Chan, 2005; Mathews et al., 2008).
Separatist tendencies in Hong Kong have typically been explained from either a
Primordialist or Instrumentalist perspective. Scholars taking the Primordialist approach
view weak cultural identity as the key and argue that Hong Kong’s distinctive colonial
experience sets Hong Kong citizens apart from their mainland counterparts by means of
language (Mandarin vs. Cantonese in speaking and simplified vs. traditional characters
in writing), social customs, and values (Lau, 2000). These cultural differences have
become more pronounced in the context of frequent economic and social communication
between the two places (Chan, 2014). For example, the English language has been
regarded as a habitus of Hong Kong society and an important constituent of Hong Kong
identity. The intrusion of Mandarin into education has incurred strong resistance among
Hong Kong citizens (Chan, 2002).
The Instrumentalist scholars focus on differing sociopolitical values and argue that
Hong Kong society generally disapproves of the Chinese authoritarian political system.
Fung (2001) notes that the downfall of Chinese national identity from 1998 onwards has
been caused by Hong Kong citizens’ resistance towards the encroachment of national
discourses on their local identity. Ma (2015) believes that Beijing’s tightened political
control has aggravated anti-China sentiments. Moreover, the Chinese state’s “main-
landisation” efforts have exceeded Hong Kong society’s limits for assimilation and thus
have backfired (Yew and Kwong, 2014). The new national education programmes
supported by the Chinese state and promoting blind patriotism, for example, have
provoked strong resistance because they are seen as eroding Hong Kong’s core political
values and political “distinctiveness” from the mainland.
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The previous literature shows that Hong Kong’s weak national identity, whether
cultural or political, is the key to separatist tendencies. Considering that national identity
in mainland China is strong, we will explore Hong Kong’s separatist tendencies by
comparing national identity between the two places. We will focus on three questions:
(1) What is the strength of cultural, sociopolitical, and pan-economic national identity in
Hong Kong in comparison with the mainland? (2) Which dimension has contributed to
the rising separatist tendencies in Hong Kong? (3) Why is China’s growing economic
power unable to effectively bridge the separatist tendencies?
Methodology
Research Design and Data Collection
We use an interlocked three-step method to collect data. First, we conduct a national
identity survey (hereafter NIS), in Beijing, Guangzhou, and Hong Kong during March
and April 2013 to collect data regarding national identity and separatist tendencies. After
an initial comparison, we find that Hong Kong students, compared with their peers on
the mainland, have comparable pan-economic identity but extremely low sociopolitical
identity. Second, during November 2014 to July 2015, we conduct in-depth semi-
structured interviews (hereafter ISSIs) with 31 Hong Kong students regarding their
perception of China’s rise, aiming to explore why their sociopolitical identity remains
weak in spite of their strong pan-economic identity. Finally, in December 2015, we
conduct two comparative follow-up surveys (FUSs) in Hong Kong and Guangzhou to
test our findings from the interviews. The following introduces the three steps in details.
National Identity Survey. During March and April 2013, we drew 1,297 college students
from four elite universities in Beijing – Peking University (北京大学, Beijing Daxue),
Tsinghua University (清华大学, Qinghua Daxue), People’s University of China (中国人
民大学, Zhongguo Renmin Daxue), and Foreign Affairs University (外交学院, Waijiao
Xueyuan) – to participate in our survey and collected 1,199 valid questionnaires. (Prior
to the survey, we ran a small-scaled pilot study from around 50 students in Guangdong
and Beijing.) We choose them as they are considered as holding enhanced political,
economic, and social opportunities to become China’s future political elite members (Li
and Bachman, 1989; Li, 1994). Their differences with Hong Kong students, therefore,
will have strong implications for future mainland–Hong Kong relations.
We adopted a stratified random sampling method. In each university, we selected
approximately 250–330 students and invited them to fill out the questionnaires in chosen
classrooms in the teaching buildings on campus. Although this strategy was only semi-
random and may therefore result in some sampling biases, such as missing those who are
not on campus, the sample remains acceptable due to the close resemblance between the
sample and the population. For example, in Peking University, during the academic year
of 2013–2014, there were about 45 per cent female students, 24.33 per cent CCP
members, 10.07 per cent ethnic minority students among the undergraduate students. In
comparison, our three Peking University samples in 2011, 2012, and 2013 had 52 per
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cent, 49 per cent, and 43.8 per cent female students; 23.4 per cent, 24.5 per cent, and
27.3 per cent CCP members; and 11 per cent, 8.8 per cent, and 7.6 per cent ethnic
minority students. Information obtained from the other universities indicated similar,
small differences between the actual student body and our cohorts. The general profile of
the participants from the four Beijing universities is reported in Table 1.
In addition to Beijing, we also collected data from a smaller sample in Guangzhou for
reference. We adopted similar sampling procedures and chose 326 students from three
local elite universities: Sun Yet-san University (中山大学, Zhongshan Daxue), South
China Science and Technology University (华南理工大学, Huanan Ligong Daxue), and
Guangdong University of Foreign Affairs (广东外语外贸大学, Guangdong Waiyu
Waimao Daxue). We obtained 299 valid questionnaires, for a response rate of 91.71 per
Table 1. Sample statistics in Beijing, Guangzhou, and Hong Kong in NIS.
Variable Description
Mean
BJ
(n ¼ 1,186)
GZ
(n ¼ 298)
HK
(n ¼ 563)
Gender Male ¼ 0, female ¼ 1 0.47 0.51 0.63a
Age 1 ¼ “17–20,” 2 ¼ “21–24,”
3 ¼ “25–29,” 4 ¼ “30 and above”
– – 1.57
Nationality Han nationality ¼ 0, minority
nationalities ¼ 1
0.07 0.06 –
Education level BJ and GZ: undergraduate ¼ 0,
postgraduate ¼ 1;
HK: 1 ¼ “lower than associate
degree,” 2 ¼ “associate degree,”
3 ¼ “bachelor and above”
0.19 0.22 2.49
Political membershipb CCP ¼ 3, CCYL ¼ 2, Others ¼ 1 2.18 2.07 –
Foreign popular
culture products
consumption
1 ¼ “never,” 2 ¼ “seldom,”
3 ¼ “sometimes,” 4 ¼ “often,”
5 ¼ “frequently”
2.86 – 2.95
English proficiency 1 ¼ “poor,” 2 ¼ “mediocre,”
3 ¼ “fair,” 4 ¼ “good,”
5 ¼ “excellent”
3.34 – 3.22
Note: BJ ¼ Beijing; HK ¼ Hong Kong; CCP ¼ Chinese Communist Party; CCYL ¼ Chinese Communist Youth
League; GZ ¼ Guangzhou; NIS ¼ national identity survey.
aThe higher proportion of female sample can be explained by higher percentages of female student population
in Hong Kong’s universities. According to the Hong Kong Women’s Commission and University Grants
Committee (UGC), among the students joining the course granted by UGC from 2012 to 2013, the
percentage of female students applying for assistant bachelor degree is 59%, bachelor degree is 53.3%, and
master degree is 60%. For details, please refer to http://www.women.gov.hk/download/research/
HKWomen2013 (November 2016).
bIn Beijing sample, the proportion of CCP and CCYL members is 7.57% and 66.55%; in Guangzhou sample,
6.67% and 83.67%.
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cent. Data for Guangzhou were chosen based on the assumption that Guangzhou is not
only geographically but also social-economically and culturally close to Hong Kong;
therefore, comparing national identity among Beijing, Guangzhou, and Hong Kong
should reveal a more balanced and representative picture concerning the national identity
differences between mainland and Hong Kong students.
Data regarding Hong Kong students’ national identity and separatist tendencies
were collected at the end of 2012 (Professor Nicholas Thomas from City University of
Hong Kong has kindly shared with us his data set of Hong Kong students collected by
him and his students). There were 563 valid questionnaires, and a general profile of the
sample is reported in Table 1. In this survey, Hong Kong students’ national identity is
measured by the same indicators as those used in Beijing and Guangzhou. Besides,
extra questions are used to measure their separatist tendencies (see “Separatist Ten-
dencies” section for details).
In-Depth Semi-Structured Interviews. These interviews were conducted from November
2014 to July 2015 immediately after the Occupy Central movement ended. Whereas some
interviewees reported participating in the movement, others said not. Some claimed fre-
quently going back to the mainland to visit relatives or short trip; but a few stated that they
had grown up abroad and had travelled to the mainland very few times. However, they all
claimed to have reasonably good knowledge about mainland China through either direct
visits or mass media. The general profile of the interviewees is listed in Table 2.
During the interviews, we deliberately focused on questions concerning the students’
perception of China’s economic rise and China’s sociopolitical and cultural character-
istics. For example, we asked them about their perception and evaluation of China’s
economic development. We solicited their opinions about China’s political institutions,
Table 2. General profile of the interviewees.
Number of Interviewees Number of Interviewees
University Gender
HKU 10 Male 18
PolyU 7 Female 13
CityU 5
CUHK 9
Major Grade
Finance 4 Sophomore 3
Marketing 1 Junior 6
Accounting 3 Senior 7
Management 3 Post-graduate 1
Engineering 1 Unreported 14
Social Policy 1
Unreported 18
Note: HKU ¼ The University of Hong Kong; PolyU ¼ Hong Kong Polytechnic University; CUHK ¼ Chinese
University of Hong Kong; CityU ¼ City University of Hong Kong.
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social systems, and traditional culture. We also invited them to express the differences
between mainland China and Hong Kong and encouraged them to freely discuss their
experiences of China and of mainland Chinese people. As our purpose is to explore
their separatist tendencies, we did not make similar interviews with the mainland
students. (In fact, we have interviewed a few mainland students about their perceptions
of the Occupy Central Movement in Hong Kong. We gave it up quickly as these topics
tended to be sensitive.)
Follow-Up Survey. To test our findings from the interviews, in December 2015, about
one year after the Occupy Central movement, we invited 530 students from Hong Kong
(HKU, PolyU, CUHK, and CityU) and 280 students from four universities in
Guangzhou (Sun Yet-san University, South China Science and Technology University,
South China Normal University, and Jinan University) to participate in the surveys
regarding their perception of China’s economic rise and sociopolitical development. The
response rate in Hong Kong and Guangzhou is 94.15 per cent and 95.17 per cent,
respectively (see Table 1A in Appendix 1). The sampling procedures for the two surveys
are similar to the first round of survey (NIS) mentioned previously.
Indicators and Measurements
Separatist Tendencies. Separatist tendencies is measured by the extent to which Hong
Kong students put their Hong Kong identity above their Chinese identity, that is, to what
extent they consider themselves a Hongkonger vis-a-vis Chinese. Separatist tendencies
here do not contain the behavioural intention for secessionist moves because our study
concerns the student group as a whole rather than some extreme activists. It is the
“psychological distance from the larger group” that is our focus. The students were
required to choose from the four self-perceived identity categories – “Hongkonger” (香
港人, Xianggang ren), “Chinese Hongkonger” (中国的香港人, Zhongguo de Xiang-
gang ren), “Hong Kong Chinese” (香港的中国人, Xianggang de Zhongguo ren), and
“Chinese” (中国人, Zhongguo ren) (see Table 3). Among them, “Hongkonger” means
sheer preference for their local identity over a national identity, suggesting the highest
separatist tendencies. “Chinese Hongkonger” and “Hong Kong Chinese” show an
overlap of local and national identity. The former indicates stronger preference for the
Table 3. Separatist tendencies of Hong Kong students in NIS.
Self-identity Frequency Per cent (%)
Hongkonger 306 54.45
Chinese Hongkonger 125 22.24
Hong Kong Chinese 39 6.94
Chinese 92 16.37
Total 562 100
Note: NIS: national identity survey.
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local identity and therefore higher separatist tendencies. “Chinese” indicates the full
embracement of a Chinese identity and is associated with the lowest separatist
tendencies.
National Identity. National identity is measured by the students’ pride in China’s
achievements in eleven domains (see Table 4). Regarding the three dimensions of
national identity, sociopolitical identity is measured by their pride in “political institu-
tions,” “social security,” and “social fairness among all classes”; cultural identity is
gauged by “contemporary arts and literature,” “traditional culture,” and “Chinese his-
tory”; and pan-economic identity is assessed by “economic development”, “science and
technology”, “military power”, “international influence,” and “sports achievement.”
(“Sports achievements” especially those in the international sports competition are widely
seen as part of China’s international influence.) The Cronbach’s a for the three identity
scales are all over 0.70 (see Table 4), indicating adequate internal reliability. (Cronbach’s
a is generally used as a measurement of internal consistency of a psychometric instru-
ment. In other words, it measures how well a set of variables or items measures a single,
one-dimensional latent aspect of individuals.)While separatist tendencies emphasise on a
general orientation of one’s national/local identity, national identity here mainly mea-
sures a respondent’s perceptions and evaluations of China’s three specific/concrete
aspects that contribute to their general national orientation.
Attitudes about China’s Economic Achievements and Sociopolitical Problems. This part
is measured in the FUSs by the students’ expressed agreement regarding the four
statements in Table 8. Because they are not indicators for a single variable, we do not
check their validity and reliability.
Findings and Discussion
Comparing National Identities between Mainland China and Hong Kong
By comparing the two (see Table 4), we find that the Hong Kong group shows only a
small gap with their Beijing and Guangzhou counterparts in pride of China's economic
development and international influence. The average mean of pan-economic identity is
4.74 in Beijing, 4.89 in Guangzhou, and 4.50 in Hong Kong (Table 4). To our surprise,
the Hong Kong students display even greater pride in China’s “science and technology”
and “sports achievements” than their Beijing counterparts, which clearly suggests that
they appreciate China’s rise in economic importance and international status, and take
pride in it along with their mainland peers.
However, Hong Kong students have significantly lower sociopolitical identity. As
Table 4 shows, their average mean of sociopolitical identity is only 2.61, compared to
3.33 and 3.40 in Beijing and Guangzhou, respectively. Their pride in China’s political
institutions is extremely low, although the two mainland groups’ evaluations of China’s
sociopolitical features are not high either. As Table 4 shows, the mean value for political
institution in Hong Kong is 2.86, compared to 3.94 and 4.03 in Beijing and Guangzhou,
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respectively. They also have comparatively lower cultural identity, although Hong Kong
students’ pride in “traditional Chinese culture” is similar to that of their peers. Their
mean values for pride in “Contemporary Chinese arts and literature” and “Chinese
history” are 4.80 and 5.45, compared with 6.12 and 6.15 in Beijing and 5.60 and 6.16 in
Guangzhou, respectively. Nevertheless, differences in their cultural identity with the
mainland groups in general are smaller than the differences in sociopolitical identity.
We find that Hong Kong students exhibit comparably strong pan-economic identity
but comparatively weak sociopolitical and cultural identity. We arrive, then, at the next
question: Which national identity dimension(s) is (are) most closely related with rising
separatist tendencies in Hong Kong?
Linking National Identities and Separatist Tendencies in Hong Kong
We examine the relations between the Hong Kong students’ three dimensions of national
identity and their separatist tendencies by building two multinomial logistic regression
(mlogit) models. Both multinomial logistic regression and ordinal logistic regression
(ologit) can be used to analyse the case here. While mlogit assumes the dependent
variable contains different categories, ologit assumes it contains different categories
which have something in common but are different in order, for example, different
educational levels. We choose mlogit because we use the comparatively neutral “Chinese
Hongkonger” as the base group, and its comparison with the two extreme groups
“Hongkongers” and “Chinese” separately can be seen as two separate comparisons with
different groups, rather than one comparison of several groups in different degrees.
Although the four different identity categories, in definition, should contain common
characters, their commonalities may not strictly follow the model of different education
levels (which can be seen as single-dimensioned). They may contain several dimensions
such as local identity and attitudes towards China, and so on. This could make things
very complicated. Considering this, we choose mlogit instead.
We set three national identity dimensions as independent variables and separatist
tendencies as the dependent variable, with six demographic and social background
variables, such as gender, age, income, and English proficiency, as control variables (see
Table 5). Mlogit regression was chosen because separatist tendencies, the dependent
variable, is categorical in nature. “Separatist tendencies” is divided into four categories:
“Hongkonger”, “Chinese Hongkonger”, “Hong Kong Chinese,” and “Chinese.” In the
Mlogit models, we set the relatively neutral “Chinese Hongkonger” as the base group
and merge “Hong Kong Chinese” and “Chinese” into a single group (because the
number of “Hong Kong Chinese” students is so small that the regression results com-
paring this group and the base group are not reliable). Our mlogit model includes two
logistic regression models with the following common reference group:
ln
½PðY ¼ y1ÞjX 
½PðY ¼ y0ÞjX  ¼ a1 þ
XK
k¼1
bk1Xk
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ln
½PðY ¼ y2ÞjX 
½PðY ¼ y0ÞjX  ¼ a2 þ
XK
k¼1
bk2Xk
We then examine how “Hongkonger” (Y ¼ y1), “Hong Kong Chinese” (Y ¼ y2), and
“Chinese” differ from “Chinese Hongkongers” (Y ¼ y0) in the three national identity
dimensions. The results are shown in Table 5. For a better understanding of the results,
we will first interpret the meaning of the four separatist categories. Both “Hongkongers”
and “Chinese Hongkongers” can be understood as separatists because they place their
local identity above national identity. “Hongkongers” are seen as extremists and “Chi-
nese Hongkongers” are moderates who recognise some convergence of Hong Kong and
Chinese identity. “Hong Kong Chinese” and “Chinese” are national loyalists, especially
the latter. As Table 5 shows, the coefficient of sociopolitical identity is not significant for
“Hongkonger,” but it is significantly positive for “Chinese” (b ¼ .4438, p < .01). This
means that moderate separatists (“Chinese Hongkongers”) and extremists (“Hon-
gkongers”) share similarly weak sociopolitical identities and there are no significant
differences between them in this regard. However, their sociopolitical identities are
significantly weaker than those of national loyalists (“Hong Kong Chinese/Chinese”).
The coefficient of pan-economic identity is significantly negative for “Hongkongers” (b
¼ .493, p < .01), but not significant for “Chinese.” This means that moderate
separatists (“Chinese Hongkongers”) have a significantly stronger pan-economic identity
than extremists (“Hongkongers”) but a pan-economic identity similar to that of national
loyalists (“Hong Kong Chinese/Chinese”). Moreover, the coefficient of cultural identity
is not significant for “Hongkongers” or “Chinese,” suggesting that it is unrelated to
separatist tendencies, matching our expectations.
The results suggest that Hong Kong’s sociopolitical identity conflict with China is the
primary cause of its growing separatist tendencies because it is closely associated with
Table 5. The mlogit regression models for separatist tendencies.
Hongkonger Hong Kong Chinese/Chinese
Gender 0.093 (0.239) 0.055 (0.283)
Age 0.030 (0.188) 0.338 (0.216)
Education degree 0.177 (0.163) 0.321 (0.199)
Income 0.008 (0.186) 0.111 (0.216)
Foreign products consumption 0.040 (0.112) 0.002 (0.131)
English proficiency 0.031 (0.131) 0.207 (0.154)
Pan-economic identity 0.493** (0.151) 0.109 (0.181)
Cultural identity 0.233 (0.133) 0.065 (0.164)
Sociopolitical identity 0.153 (0.118) 0.438** (0.134)
Constant 3.512*** (0.904) 1.551 (1.098)
Observations 542 542
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001, the Pseudo R2 is 0.072.
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the gap between separatists and Chinese loyalists. This also echoes the previous
descriptive finding that the sociopolitical identity difference is the strongest between the
two places. Pan-economic identity is related to variations between extremist and mod-
erate separatists. Moderate separatists tend to have a stronger pan-economic identity than
extremists. This means that China’s growing economic strength should produce an
ideational spill-over effect upon the students’ self-perceived relations with China.
However, such effect is limited as it only facilitates the transformation from extremists to
moderates but fails to bridge the sociopolitical identity conflict that causes general
separatist tendencies (Figure 2).
Considering that weak sociopolitical identity is the key to rising separatist tendencies
in Hong Kong, why China’s rise has not strengthened Hong Kong students’ socio-
political identity? In other words, why does the sociopolitical identity of Hong Kong
students remain weak despite their strong pan-economic identity? The following section
will examine the question by comparing Hong Kong students’ national identity structure
with that of the mainland group, who, as was shown in the “Comparing National
Identities between Mainland China and Hong Kong” section, has a similar pan-economic
identity but stronger sociopolitical identity.
Comparing National Identity Structures
Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) is employed to study the structure of national identity
in Hong Kong and mainland China. EFA is a statistical method commonly used to
explore the relationships among a set of items by uncovering their underlying structure.
It can reveal whether several variables are decided by one common latent factor such that
they co-vary in the same direction or are influenced by different factors such that they
vary in different ways. EFA is used here to test whether the three dimensions of national
identity in the two places – and, in particular, pan-economic identity and sociopolitical
identity – have similar relations.
The principal-factor method (one type of EFA) and orthogonal rotation were con-
ducted on the NIS samples from Beijing, Guangzhou, and Hong Kong, and the factors
with Eigenvalues greater than 1 were retained as effective components. The results show
that the Hong Kong and mainland groups do have different national identity structures.
As Table 6 shows, although all the items of pan-economic and cultural identity load on
to the same factor (factor 1) for the Hong Kong group, sociopolitical identity items are
Hongkonger
Chinese
Hongkonger
HK Chinese
Chinese
Pan-economic
Identity
Socio-political
Identity
Figure 2. National identity and separatist tendency categories.
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decided by the other factor (factor 2, see Table 6), suggesting that pan-economic identity
in Hong Kong is largely independent of sociopolitical identity and that the Hong Kong
group tends to view the pan-economic and sociopolitical sides of China as distinctive
and separate.
For the Beijing and Guangzhou group, however, all the items of sociopolitical
identity and pan-economic identity load on to the same factor (factor 1), indicating that
the two identities go together for Beijing students. (Our Guangzhou sample produces a
similar structure, except that one of pan-economic identity items, “sports achievements,”
loads on factor 2 and co-varies more with cultural identity rather than with sociopolitical
identity.) In other words, the Beijing and Guangzhou samples tend to merge the two
together, which contrasts with the Hong Kong sample. Such structural differences help
explain why the mainland and Hong Kong group share similar pan-economic identity,
but the Hong Kong group’s sociopolitical identity is much weaker.
Post-Materialist Perception of China’s Rise
How can we explain the disjunction between pan-economic and sociopolitical identities
in Hong Kong? Our in-depth interviews with 31 Hong Kong students reveal that this
disjunction may arise because Hong Kong students take a post-materialist view of
China’s economic growth and sociopolitical status. Post-materialism refers to a set of
values that emphasise individual self-expression and personal freedom (Inglehart, 1971,
2008). It was first postulated in the early 1970s by Ronald Inglehart, who after extensive
survey research on selected Western European societies, argued that value orientations in
Table 6. Exploratory factor analysis of national identity in Beijing and Hong Kong.
National
Identity Measurement items
BJ (N ¼ 1,186) GZ (N ¼ 298) HK (N ¼ 563)
Factor1 Factor2 Factor1 Factor2 Factor1 Factor2
Sociopolitical
identity
Political institutions 0.69 0.18 0.74 0.19 0.18 0.69
Social security 0.71 0.01 0.75 0.03 0.12 0.74
Social fairness among all
classes
0.70 0.04 0.76 0.10 0.01 0.73
Pan-economic
identity
Economic development 0.52 0.33 0.49 0.41 0.60 0.35
Science and technology 0.53 0.29 0.57 0.25 0.59 0.36
Military power 0.52 0.30 0.49 0.35 0.48 0.40
International influence 0.59 0.38 0.50 0.32 0.61 0.26
Sports achievement 0.43 0.34 0.14 0.46 0.59 0.23
Cultural
identity
Contemporary art and
literature
0.08 0.67 0.02 0.59 0.54 0.16
Traditional culture 0.16 0.61 0.12 0.69 0.70 0.08
Chinese history 0.08 0.69 0.06 0.68 0.69 0.00
Eigenvalues of factors 3.65 1.11 3.51 1.47 3.77 1.30
Note: BJ ¼ Beijing; HK ¼ Hong Kong; GZ ¼ Guangzhou. Due to missing values not all valid questionnaires
could be included in the factor analysis.
Pang and Jiang 17
post-industrial societies have been gradually transformed from materialist values
emphasising economic well-being and safety to post-materialist values that stress per-
sonal freedom and self-expression. This notion gives priority to greater citizen input in
government decisions, an ideal of humanitarian society, and a clean environment, and
accordingly, it opposes prioritising economic growth and social stability over environ-
mental protection and civil liberties (Inglehart et al., 2004). As Table 7 shows, post-
materialism is more widely accepted in Hong Kong than in mainland China.
During our interviews, the Hong Kong students displayed strong post-material value
orientations. For example, many showed discontent with China’s restrictions on civil
liberties, particularly those involving freedom both of press and speech. One student from
HKU said, “Each time when I get back to the mainland, I find I cannot get access to many
websites, nor can I use Facebook or Twitter.” Another one from PolyU said, “Although I
learn from the textbook in middle school that the Chinese people can express grievances
and discontent with their government by petition, they are, in fact, heavily controlled by
the government and it is difficult for them to voice their appeals.” The students also
expressed apprehension about China’s social disparity. One student from HKU com-
mented, “Social disparity is really huge in China. I have been to Yunnan province once,
and I saw many poverty-stricken villagers and was very much surprised.” Another student
from CUHK said, “People at the bottom of the (mainland) society cannot share the
economic prosperity. . . .Those migrant labors I met toil so much but do not have equal
medical care or education benefits for their children.” These findings are in line with the
2013 World Values Survey in Hong Kong, which shows that post-materialist values are
dominant among educated young people (see Table 7) (Chiu, 2010).
Accordingly, the Hong Kong students attach less importance to economic growth and
tend to separate it from the state. During our interviews regarding the mainland’s eco-
nomic development, most expressed recognition of it. Several even claimed that China’s
top-tiered cities, such as Shanghai and Guangzhou, were close to Hong Kong or even
surpassed Hong Kong in some aspects. However, few of the interviewees connected
China’s economic achievement with the Chinese state. Only two did so, but these
interviewees believed that the state played a negative role in China’s economic devel-
opment. For instance, one student from CityU said, “The (Chinese government’s) GDP
target, as I see it, is just a vanity project (政绩工程, zhengji gongcheng).” The other,
from HKU, claimed that “local governments are short-sighted. They destroyed the
environment and wasted natural resources for some small material gains.”
Our FUSs in Hong Kong show that only 30.25 per cent of Hong Kong students agree
that “China’s economic development should mostly be attributed to the Chinese gov-
ernment.” The majority either express “no idea” (approximately 40 per cent) or disagree
with the statement (30 per cent, see Table 8), which contrasts with the 80.6 per cent of
the mainland students who agree with the statement. Moreover, only 45.69 per cent
Hong Kong students agree that “China’s development in science and technology should
mostly be attributed to the Chinese government,” but that number reaches 67.7 per cent
on the mainland (see Table 8). This may be due to that the mainland students are
developmentalism-oriented, that is, they tend to believe that economic development, and
more broadly speaking, growth of a country’s comprehensive power such as science and
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technology, should be the primary task for a regime. This result helps explain why pan-
economic identity is distinct from sociopolitical identity in Hong Kong, whereas the two
co-vary in the mainland. This suggests that due to a post-materialist value orientation,
Table 8. Attitudes about China’s economic achievements and sociopolitic problems.
Per cent (%)
N (HK) ¼ 499,
N (GZ) ¼ 268
T-Test
(HK-GZ)SA/A SD/D DK/missing
Economic development should mostly be attributed
to the Chinese government.
HK 30.06 29.86 40.08 0.90***
GZ 80.60 6.72 12.69
Scientific and technological achievement should
mostly be attributed to the Chinese government.
HK 45.69 15.63 38.68 0.36***
GZ 67.16 10.45 22.39
Social unfairness should mostly be attributed to the
political institutions.
HK 84.37 3.81 11.82 0.38***
GZ 76.87 9.70 13.43
Social unfairness should mostly be attributed to
comparatively low level of economic development.
HK 30.46 39.28 30.26 0.41***
GZ 53.73 27.24 19.03
Note: SA ¼ Strongly Agree; A ¼ Agree; SD ¼ Strongly Disagree; D ¼ Disagree; DK¼ Don’t Know; HK ¼
Hong Kong; GZ ¼ Guangzhou.
***p < .001.
Table 7. Developmentalist and post-materialist attitudes in the 2013 Hong Kong and 2012
China World Values Surveys.
Ideological
frameworks Items
Proportion of those who believe
the item is the most important or
second most important for a
country’s future (%)
HK China
Developmentalism Having a high level of economic growth 52.1 77.1
Maintaining order in the nation 31.1 62.4
Fighting rising prices 41.2 75.3
Having a stable economy 52.1 68.2
Post-materialism Protecting freedom of speech 58.0 14.1
People having more say in important
government decisions
51.3 37.7
Progressing towards a less impersonal
and more humane society
63.9 54.7
Progressing towards a society in which
ideas count more than money
43.7 35.9
Source: “World Values Survey Program”, http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp (assessed 23 November
2018).
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China’s economic rise may not be easily translated into a stronger political identity, and
worse yet, that the Chinese state’s reckless development measures that disregard the
environment may only incur disapproval.
This post-materialist mentality has also constrained Hong Kong students from
viewing China’s economic growth as a solution to its social ills. In discussing China’s
sociopolitical ills, our interviewees are likely to blame its authoritarian political sys-
tem, which restricts people from voicing their needs. A few attribute the problems to
mainland China’s comparative backwardness in economic development, which inhibits
proper supply of social services for all members of society. The follow-up survey in
Hong Kong shows that 84 per cent of the Hong Kong respondents agree that “China’s
social unfairness should mostly be attributed to the illness in the Chinese political
institutions,” whereas only 30 per cent of respondents believe that “China’s social
unfairness should mostly be attributed to China’s comparatively lower level of eco-
nomic development.” However, more than half of the mainland respondents agree with
the latter statement (see Table 8). Although they also believe that the Chinese political
institutions are responsible for social unfairness, they are more likely than Hong Kong
students to believe that current social imperfections are caused by China’s economic
underdevelopment and therefore can be corrected through economic progress. Eco-
nomic growth, therefore, carries optimism for a fairer society. However, such optimism
does not prevail among the Hong Kong students, who believe that economic growth,
even if it is strong, cannot effectively ameliorate the current social problems in China.
The differences show that the authoritarian Chinese state’s official propaganda hold
obvious impact upon the Chinese students but negligible influence upon the Hong
Kong students, due to Hong Kong’s semi-democratic system in which though free
election is restricted the mass media environment is relatively free (Overholt, 2001).
More importantly, they explain why pan-economic and sociopolitical identities are
separate in Hong Kong and China’s economic rise does not strengthen the Hong Kong
students’ sociopolitical identity with China.
That said, however, we do not suggest that Hong Kong is a highly post-materialist
society or the Hong Kong youth resisted China’s influence only for value differences.
Although well-developed and highly wealthy, the Hong Kong society is deeply divided in
personal income and family wealth. Its GINI coefficient is among the highest in the world
and poverty is an obvious problem among the bottom class, and the young generation also
has to face soaring housing prices (Peng, 2019). Some literature argues that the youth are
in fact striving for better material life in the name of democracy (Forrest and Xian, 2018).
While this is true, our findings also show that the youth’ separatist tendencies are not only
driven by desire for better financial well-being, but also their post-materialist dreams.
Robustness Test
In this study, we use data from two Hong Kong surveys to explain why separatist
tendencies in Hong Kong have grown despite China’s economic rise. By the first survey,
we find that the disjunction between sociopolitical and pan-economic identity is crucial
for explaining rising separatist tendencies. We then conduct the second survey measuring
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the Hong Kong students’ attitudes towards China’s economic achievements and socio-
political problems and use the results to infer the finding from the first survey. However,
if the samples of the two surveys do not match, the analysis based on the second sample
cannot be generalisable to the findings in the first survey. To test whether there is such a
matching problem, we use multi-group confirmatory factor analysis (MGCFA) to
examine whether the two samples share the same national identity structure. Since the
attitude data obtained in the second sample are mainly used to explain the national
identity structure found in the first sample, whether the two shares the same national
identity structure is the key.
We conduct the MGCFA in three steps. The first is a configural invariance test, which
examines whether the sample pattern of fixed and free loadings in the factor loading
matrix holds for the two samples. As Table 9 shows, the results of the configural model
show a satisfactory fit (TLI ¼ .914, CFI ¼ .934, RMSEA ¼ .069). As Figure 3 shows,
the same configuration of loadings of the indicators of factors is observed in the two
samples. The second step is to examine whether the two have metric invariance, that is,
that not only is the pattern of fixed and free parameters the same across the group but the
parameters that estimate themselves are equal or numerically identical across the two
samples (Chen, 2007). As Table 9 shows, the results of the metric model show a good fit
(TLI ¼ .920, CFI ¼ .932, RMSEA ¼ .067). The last step is to compare the less restricted
configural model and the more restricted metric model, and their difference is not sig-
nificant (DTLI ¼ .006 and DCFI ¼ .002, p < .01), indicating that the national identity
structure should be fully invariant across the two samples. Thus, analysis and conclu-
sions based on the second sample should be generalisable to the first sample.
As a robustness test for the basic regression results (Table 5), we merge “Chinese
Hongkonger” and “Hong Kong Chinese” into a single group and examine how
“Hongkonger” (Y ¼ y1) and “Chinese” (Y ¼ y2) differ from “Chinese Hongkongers/
Hong Kong Chinese” (Y ¼ y0) in the three national identity dimensions. The latter two
categories suggest a mixture of the Chinese and Hongkonger identity, and if this group
should show stronger pan-economic identity than “Hongkongers” but weaker socio-
political identity than “Chinese”, our previous results are robust. As Table 10 shows, the
coefficient of pan-economic identity is significantly negative for “Hongkongers” (b ¼
.411, p < .01), while the coefficient of sociopolitical identity is significantly positive
for “Chinese” (b ¼ .441, p < .01). These results, thus, confirm that our results in
Table 5 are robust.
Table 9. MGCFA fit indexes across two Hong Kong samples.
Model S-Bw2 df DS-Bw2 Ddf TLI CFI AIC RMSEA (90% CI)
Configural 365.278 84 .914 .934 33615.820 .069 (.061, .078)
Metric 389.611 93 17.075 9 .920 .932 33622.151 .067 (.059, .075)
Note: In the configural and metric model, if TLI > .9, CFI > .9, RMSEA < .8, the model can be considered as
fitting the data (Browne and Cudeck, 1992; Medsker et al., 1994). S-Bw2 ¼ Satorra–Bentler Scaled Chi Square;
TLI ¼ Tucker–Lewis index; CFI ¼ comparative fit index; RMSEA ¼ root mean square error of approximation.
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Concluding Remarks
This article seeks to understand why Hong Kong youth’s separatist tendencies have
grown despite China’s growing economic attractiveness. It extends the existing literature
Figure 3. The metric structural model of the two Hong Kong samples. The left is for the first
Hong Kong sample, and the right is for the second. The number to the left of each rectangle is the
standardised factor loading, while the number to the right is the residual variance.
Table 10. The mlogit regression models for separatist tendencies (robustness test).
Hongkonger Chinese
Gender 0.176 (0.217) 0.228 (0.306)
Age 0.184 (0.167) 0.045 (0.226)
Education degree 0.131 (0.150) 0.298 (0.217)
Income 0.043 (0.166) 0.020 (0.227)
Foreign products consumption 0.001 (0.103) 0.109 (0.138)
English proficiency 0.005 (0.120) 0.390** (0.165)
Pan-economic identity 0.411*** (0.138) 0.112 (0.195)
Cultural identity 0.217* (0.122) 0.147 (0.176)
Sociopolitical identity 0.087 (0.108) 0.441*** (0.138)
Constant 3.143*** (0.822) 3.285*** (1.196)
Observations 542 542
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
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concerning Hong Kong’s national identity and China–Hong Kong relations in the fol-
lowing ways. First, it makes a systematic comparison between three dimensions of
national identities between Hong Kong and the mainland college students and shows that
Hong Kong’s pan-economic dimension is comparatively strong but that the socio-
political and cultural dimensions are relatively weak. The scholarship addressing
national identity in Hong Kong is rich; nevertheless, most studies tend to focus on Hong
Kong alone and fail to engage in comparison, particularly with mainland China, and this
often leads to difficulties in determining the strength of Hong Kong’s national identity.
Second, this study introduces a previously under-examined but increasingly significant
national identity dimension: pan-economic identity. The previous scholarship tends to
focus on either Hong Kong citizens’ identification with cultural China or their disapproval
of political China. With China’s continued economic rise, pan-economic identity is of
increasing importance in terms of affecting Hong Kong citizens’ overall perception of
China, although it will not necessarily mitigate their separatist tendencies. This study finds
that the Hong Kong students’ pan-economic identity can help explain the differences
between the extremists and moderates within Hong Kong’s separatist groups.
Third, it develops the concept of “separatist tendencies” which is different from
general separatism. “Separatist tendencies” are indicative of the propensity to distance
oneself from a larger group psychologically but do not resort to secessionist moves in
seeking absolute political independence for various reasons. Defensive in nature,
separatist tendencies strongly resist economic, social, and political assimilation by
mainland China. This study also shows that the Hong Kong students’ separatist ten-
dencies are primarily related to their extremely weak sociopolitical identity but not
related to the students’ cultural identity. This conclusion is different from the existing
literature arguing that the cultural differences between China and Hong Kong are sources
for anti-China sentiments.
Fourth, this study provides a new ideological approach in explaining Hong Kong’s
separatist tendencies and thus contributes to a broader understanding regarding how
China’s economic rise affects its relations with Hong Kong. The recent scholarship
concerning China and Hong Kong relations focuses on discussing the two seemingly
contradictory trends: China and Hong Kong’s increasing socio-economic integration
(Shen, 2014), on the one hand, and their rising conflicts, on the other hand. Existing
literature, for example, documents both macro-level elite conflicts and societal con-
frontations between the two places (Fong, 2014; Hung, 2012; Lau and Kuan, 2002; Lo,
2013; Ma, 2007, 2011, 2015) and micro-level Hong Kong citizens’ changing attitudes
towards China such as their declining national identity and political trust (Chan and
Chan, 2014; Fung, 2001; Kim and Ng, 2008; Lee and Chan, 2005; Mathews et al., 2008;
Yew and Kwong, 2014). In explaining the two contradictory trends, current scholarship
concentrates on the unequal distribution of economic integration benefits among dif-
ferent social classes in Hong Kong and a widespread sense among the public that the
Chinese streaming into Hong Kong have stolen their public resources (Zheng and Wan,
2013). This study examines the issue from an ideological perspective, that is, the Hong
Kong public, particularly the young, take a post-materialist attitude in perceiving China’s
economic growth and sociopolitics. The Hong Kong students are much less likely to
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ascribe China’s economic rise to the Chinese state or to believe that economic devel-
opment can bring a better sociopolitical future for China. Their perception of China’s
economic rise has not strengthened their sociopolitical identity with China, nor has it
assuaged their apprehension for possible sociopolitical conflicts between the two places.
In other words, China’s economic power is unable to provide a sociopolitical model that
gratifies the Hong Kong students’ rising post-materialist expectations. Such political
value differences can also account for the anti-China sentiments embodied in the 2019
anti-extradition bill protests, which originate clearly from their distrust in the Chinese
political and judicial system.
Such ideological differences, aside from being affected by different economic devel-
opment stages in the two societies, are closely related with their distinctive political
systems. In China, the authoritarian state can cultivate its preferred materialist mentality
among its young citizens by its monopoly of education and mass media. However, in
Hong Kong’s semi-democratic system where the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region government has very limited control over education and mass media, the young
generation’s political values and outlook tend to be more diversified and can be shaped by
various sources including the post-materialist Western media. This suggests that the
economic achievement in an authoritarian system may be seen and interpreted from dif-
ferent angles in a comparatively more diversified semi-democratic or democratic society.
This finding has strong implications for China’s future relations with Hong Kong and,
to some extent, with other peripheral societies such as Taiwan. It implies that China faces
serious difficulties in transferring its economic strength into an assimilating power for
societies where post-materialist value orientations rise or even dominate. The recent
scholarship concerning the China–Taiwan relationship also suggests that China’s rising
economic power has not been translated into sociopolitical attraction for the Taiwanese
citizens (Brown, 2004; Welsh and Chang, 2015; Wu, 2007; Wachman, 1994). People with
post-materialist values in democratic societies may not appreciate China’s economic
strength, instead, viewing it as a threat to their own sociopolitical model. In fact, our
interviews with Hong Kong students suggest that their perception of China’s rise could
possibly turn into fear and apprehension that a powerful China may destroy their current
life, particularly after the perceived economic benefits from integration with China have
been exhausted. Many interviewees now believe that mainland China’s economic growth,
particularly the rising purchasing power of mainland citizens, has brought more dis-
advantages than benefits to Hong Kong. The greater that China’s economic strength is, the
more destructive China will be perceived in relation to the current sociopolitical order and
the stronger the resistance may be in places such as Hong Kong.
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Appendix 1
Table 1A. Sample statistics for the 2015 Guangzhou and Hong Kong surveys.
Variable Description
Mean
GZ HK
Gender Male ¼ 0, female ¼ 1. 0.56 0.48
Age 1–4 mean the age is “18 and below,” “19–22,” “23–28,” and
“29 and above,” respectively.
– 1.85
Nationality Han nationality ¼ 0, minority nationalities ¼ 1. 0.07 –
Education level GZ: 1–4 mean “freshman,” “sophomore,” “junior,” and
“senior,” respectively.
HK: 1–4 means “associate degree,” “undergraduate,”
“graduate,” and “other,” respectively.
1.92 1.99
Family income GZ: 1–4 mean “4,000 RMB and below,” “4,001–8,000 RMB,”
“8,001–12,000 RMB,” and “above 12,000 RMB,”
respectively.
HK: 1–4 mean “below 15,000 HKD,” “15,000–22,000 HKD,”
“22,000–50,000 HKD,” and “above 50,000 HKD,”
respectively.
2.43 2.53
Political membership CCP ¼ 3, CCYL ¼ 2, Others ¼ 1. 2.04 –
English proficiency 1–5 mean “very poor,” “poor,” “common,” “fair,” and “very
good,” respectively.
– 3.64
Note: HK ¼ Hong Kong; GZ ¼ Guangzhou.
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